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I. Introduction 
Tribal governments are an often-overlooked entity within the United 
States’ federal system. Tribes are sovereign entities that are free from much 
state interference. However, tribes have also historically been deemed 
dependent domestic nations over which Congress can exercise much 
authority. But Congress must usually designate when it uses this control.  
Environmental law within Indian Country presents a unique aspect of 
federalism. Initially, the federal response to environmental law ignored the 
tribe’s role. However, tribal governments were given larger roles in national 
environmental policies as their sovereignty became increasingly 
recognized. Most federal environmental statutes now recognize tribes as 
states through treatment as state (“TAS”) provisions. However, the 
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”) is the only major 
environmental statute that does not contain a TAS provision. As such, tribes 
are treated as municipalities, rendering tribal governments ineligible for 
many EPA-specific benefits of the RCRA. However, tribal governments are 
still subjected to the RCRA penalties for non-compliance. Not surprisingly, 
many tribal governments have implemented their own solid and hazardous 
waste regimes. These often either mimic the RCRA’s form or specifically 
adopt the RCRA and other federal requirements as a regulatory floor.  
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The Supreme Court’s recent decision in McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 
2452 (2020), may have added another wrinkle to the tribal authority 
calculus. Specifically, it is possible that more former tribal land will be re-
recognized as Indian Country. This could lead to more civil regulatory 
jurisdiction by tribal governments over non-Indians, particularly in the solid 
waste disposal field.  
Congress should amend the RCRA to include a TAS provision. This 
would not, however, automatically extend TAS status to Oklahoma tribes, 
which Congress singled out for TAS exclusion. Perhaps, however, the 
specter of increased tribal civil regulatory jurisdiction over non-Indians in 
eastern Oklahoma will convince Congress to reexamine its prohibition on 
Oklahoma tribal TAS designation.  
This paper will first provide the general background of tribal sovereignty 
and jurisdiction. Second, this paper will provide a background of 
environmental federalism, including the tribe’s unique position within it. 
Third, this paper will discuss the RCRA and its application to tribes. 
Fourth, this paper will discuss some tribes’ solid waste regulation programs. 
Fifth, this paper will discuss McGirt and its potential for re-recognizing 
more Indian Country and the possibility tribes could exert civil regulatory 
jurisdiction over this Indian Country. Finally, this paper makes policy 
recommendations, including that Congress should amend the RCRA to 
include a TAS provision and potential solid waste programs tribes could 
adopt.  
II. Background 
A. Tribal Sovereignty and Jurisdiction 
There are two broad planks of federal Congressional authority over 
American Indian tribes. The first is the Indian Commerce Clause, stating 
“Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o regulate Commerce . . . with the Indian 
Tribes.”
1
 The second is Congress’s authority to act as a guardian of tribes.
2
 
Often, Congress will explicitly state both sets of authority in statutes 
concerning tribes.
3
 Statutes of general applicability (such as environmental 
laws) can also apply to tribes and American Indians if Congress so 
                                                                                                             
 1. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8. 
 2. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381-82 (1886); Cherokee Nation v. 
Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 10 & 13 (1831). 
 3. See, e.g., The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C.A. § 1901 (Westlaw 
through P.L. 116-259) (“Recognizing the special relationship between the United States and 
the Indian tribes and their members and the Federal responsibility to Indian people”). 
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 Such statutes’ application to American Indians is seen easiest 
when Congress explicitly states that it applies to tribes and American 
Indians.
5
 Statutes of general applicability may also apply to tribes if 
Congressional intent is “clearly expressed in the legislative history or by the 
existence of a statutory scheme requiring national or uniform application.”
6
 
The earliest federal environmental laws did not explicitly mention tribes.
7
 
However, courts have found that some of these earlier statutes apply to 
tribes, and more recent TAS amendments have explicitly extended 
environmental laws to tribes.
8
 
Federal authority over tribes does not remove a tribe’s inherent 
sovereignty.
9
 Tribal powers are not delegated powers but “inherent powers 
of a limited sovereignty which has never been extinguished.”
10
 As Tsosie 
mentions, federal environmental laws “do not confer environmental 
regulatory authority upon the Indian nations; rather, the Indian nations’ 
inherent sovereignty already enabled them to exercise such authority in 
most cases.”
11
 Such authority also enables tribes to adopt more stringent 
regulations than federal statutes require.
12
 However, effective 
environmental regulation can likely occur only if tribes can regulate “non-
Indians on the reservation as well.”
13
 This paper turns next to tribal 
jurisdiction. 
Solid waste disposal is largely regulatory in nature, but certain tribal 
codes have implicated civil adjudicatory and criminal jurisdiction. 
Additionally, tribes located inside Public Law 280 (“P.L. 280”) states are 
subjected to more state jurisdiction than tribes in non-P.L. 280 states. 
  
                                                                                                             
 4. Jana L. Walker & Kevin Gover, Commercial Solid and Hazardous Waste Disposal 
Projects on Indian Lands, 10 Yale J. on Reg. 229, 232 (Winter 1993).  
 5. Id. at 232-33. 
 6. Id. at 233. 
 7. Rebecca Tsosie, Tribal Environmental Policy in an Era of Self-Determination: The 
Role of Ethics, Economics, and Traditional Ecological Knowledge, 21 Vt. L. Rev. 225, 233 
(Fall 1996). 
 8. Id. at 233-34. 
 9. Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law § 4.01 (Nell Jessup Newton ed. 2017) 
(hereinafter, Cohen’s Handbook).  
 10. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1978); see Cohen’s Handbook, 
supra, § 4.01(1)(a). 
 11. Tsosie, supra, at 234 (emphasis original). 
 12. Id.  
 13. Walker, supra, at 233. 
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1. Tribal Civil Regulatory Jurisdiction  
Tribal civil regulatory jurisdiction requires determining if the regulated 
area is Indian Country and whether the regulated persons are American 
Indians, tribal members, or non-Indians.
14
 First, Indian Country means: 
(a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the 
jurisdiction of the United States Government . . . including 
rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b) all dependent 
Indian communities within the borders of the United States . . . , 
and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not 




This definition of Indian Country applies to both civil and criminal 
jurisdiction despite its location in the federal criminal code
16
 and 
determining if something occurred in Indian Country is often the first step 
in any legal question involving American Indian tribes. Additionally, by 
virtue of a tribe’s sovereign status, tribal governments wield “exclusive 
tribal jurisdiction” over tribal members in Indian Country unless “there is a 
specific federal law stating otherwise.”
17
  
Tribal civil regulatory analysis becomes more difficult when the tribe is 
attempting to regulate non-Indians in Indian Country.
18
 Specifically, “the 
Supreme Court has curtailed tribal civil jurisdiction over non-Indians, 
unless the interests of the tribe or member Indians are affected.”
19
 The 
Montana test is used to determine if a tribe has civil regulatory jurisdiction 
in Indian Country over non-Indians.
20
  
                                                                                                             
 14. The Supreme Court has not clearly determined “whether the appropriate distinction 
for applying general jurisdictional rules in Indian country is the distinctions between tribal 
members and nonmembers or between Indians and non-Indians.” Cohen’s Handbook, supra 
note 9, § 6.01; see also United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 198 (2004) (applying a 
member/nonmember distinction). 
 15. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1151 (Westlaw through P.L. 116-259). 
 16. Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov’t, 522 U.S. 520, 527 (1998) (stating, 
“Although this definition by its terms relates only to federal criminal jurisdiction, we have 
recognized that is also generally applies to questions of civil jurisdiction.”); Jill Elise Grant, 
The Navajo Nation EPA’s Experience with “Treatment as a State” and Primacy, 21 Nat. 
Res. & Env’t 9, 10 (Winter 2007).  
 17. Cohen’s Handbook, supra note 9, § 6.01. 
 18. Id.  
 19. Id. 
 20. The Montana test is only necessary “when a tribe asserts its inherent authority over 
non-Indians.” Grant, supra, 13. 
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Montana v. United States involved the Crow Nation’s attempt to 
“prohibit all hunting and fishing by nonmembers of the tribe on non-Indian 
property within reservation boundaries.”
21
 The Supreme Court stated there 
is a presumption that tribes do not have civil regulatory jurisdiction over 
non-members by relying on Oliphant’s rationale.
22
 However, the Court also 
noted that “Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to exercise some 
forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservation, even on 
non-Indian fee lands.”
23
 Specifically, Montana established two ways for 
tribes to rebut the presumption that they lack civil regulatory jurisdiction 
and thus exert authority over non-Indians in Indian Country. First, “A tribe 
may regulate . . . the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual 
relationships with the tribes or its members through commercial dealing, 
contracts, leases, or other arrangements.”
24
 Second, tribes can exert civil 
regulatory authority over non-Indians in Indian Country when the non-
Indian’s conduct “threatens or has some direct effect on the political 
integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe.”
25
  
If a tribal government cannot establish civil regulatory jurisdiction over 
non-Indians in Indian Country, then state governments may be able to. 
However, there is a presumption against state environmental regulatory 
authority in Indian Country unless a state can refute this presumption, e.g., 
if the federal government were to expressly authorize state jurisdiction over 
environmental regulation in Indian Country.
26
 
2. Tribal Civil Adjudicatory Jurisdiction 
While most tribal environmental laws likely fall under civil regulatory 
jurisdiction—encompassing permits, fines, and injunctions—it is also 
possible that civil adjudicatory jurisdiction applies.
27
 Montana’s two-prong 
test is still used to determine whether a tribe can exert civil adjudicatory 
jurisdiction over a non-Indian. Additionally, Strate v. A-1 Contractors held 
                                                                                                             
 21. 450 U.S. 544, 547 (1981).  
 22. Id. at 565 (stating that “[t]hough Oliphant only determined inherent tribal authority 
in criminal matters, the principles on which it relied support the general proposition that the 
inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers 
of the tribe”). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 566. 
 26. Richard A. Du Bey, et al., Protection of the Reservation Environment, 18 Envtl. L., 
449, 455 n. 25 (Spring 1988). 
 27. See Navajo Nation Solid Waste Regulations § 504 (making solid waste landfill 
permits conditional on the applicant being subject to Navajo Nation laws).  
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol7/iss1/2
2021]      Impact of RCRA & McGirt on Trial Solid Waste Regulations 7 
 
 
that the Williams test can be used to show that the tribe does not exert civil 
adjudicatory jurisdiction.
28
 Under Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959), 
there is a presumption of tribal authority in Indian Country that the state can 
rebut. The test is, “Essentially, absent governing Acts of Congress 
[specifically envisioning P.L. 280], the question has always been whether 
the state action [meaning the assertion of state civil adjudicatory 
jurisdiction] infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their own 
laws and be ruled by them.”
29
  
3. Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction 
Likely, most tribal environmental laws involve civil regulatory or civil 
adjudicatory jurisdictions. However, some tribal environmental laws invoke 
criminal penalties.
30
 As such, a brief survey of tribal criminal jurisdiction is 
warranted. First, under the McBratney line of cases, states exert criminal 
jurisdiction over non-Indian on non-Indian crime in Indian Country.
31
 This 
is the only legal state criminal jurisdiction in Indian Country for non-P.L. 
280 states. Second, the federal government exerts criminal jurisdiction in 
Indian Country under several statutes. One is the Indian Country Crimes 
Act, stating that federal criminal law of its enclaves (except the District of 
Columbia) applies in Indian Country.
32
 There are three exceptions to this 
jurisdiction: (1) the crime is committed by an American Indian against 
another American Indian or another American Indian’s property; (2) the 
tribe has already punished the perpetrator; and (3) if treaty rights grant the 
tribe jurisdiction.
33
 The second statute is the Assimilative Crimes Act that 
assimilates state crimes from the surrounding state that are not part of the 
federal code and applies that state code against American Indians in Indian 
Country.
34
 The third is the Major Crimes Act (“MCA”) that subjects an 
American Indian committing any enumerated crime against anyone in 
Indian Country to federal criminal jurisdiction.
35
 Finally, tribes exert 
                                                                                                             
 28. 520 U.S. 438, 459 (1997).  
 29. Williams at 271.  
 30. See Navajo Nation Solid Waste Act § 503(B).  
 31. See United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1881); Draper v. United States, 164 
U.S. 240 (1896); and New York ex rel. Ray v. Martin, 326 U.S. 496 (1946).  
 32. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1152 (Westlaw through P.L. 116-259). 
 33. Id. 
 34. 18 U.S.C.A. § 13 (Westlaw through P.L. 116-259); see Unites States v. Marcyes, 
557 F.2d 1361 (9th Cir. 1977) (holding that only state crimes, not regulations, assimilate 
under the Act).  
 35. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1153 (Westlaw through P.L. 116-259) (enumerating, inter alia, 
murder, manslaughter, kidnapping, arson, burglary, and robbery). 
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criminal jurisdiction solely over American Indians.
36
 However, many tribal 
courts are essentially limited to misdemeanor courts under the Indian Civil 
Rights Act, which limits tribal sentencing to one year for any one offense 
(not to exceed three years total) or fines of $5,000 per offense (not to 
exceed $15,000 total).
37
 But tribes can elect to come under the Tribal Law 
and Order Act, 25 U.SC. §§ 1302(b)-(d), allowing increased sentences of 





4. Public Law 280
40
 
Under P.L. 280, certain states have “jurisdiction over offenses committed 
by or against Indians in . . . Indian country . . . to the same extent that such 
State . . . has jurisdiction over offenses committed elsewhere within the 
State.”
41
 In full P.L. 280 states, the state exerts criminal and civil 
adjudicatory jurisdiction.
42
 P.L. 280 applies to six mandatory states.
43
 P.L. 
280 is also available to any other state.
44
 Ten optional states have accepted 
P.L. 280 jurisdiction and some have accepted less than full criminal and 
                                                                                                             
 36. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribes, 435 U.S. 191 (1978) (stating that tribes cannot 
exert criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians).  
 37. 25 U.S.C.A. § 1302(b) (Westlaw through P.L. 116-259).  
 38. Tribes must meet “certain procedural requirements” to qualify for the Act. David H. 
Getches, et. al., Cases and Materials on Federal Indian Law, 585-86 (7th ed. 2017). 
 39. Tribes exerting this enhanced sentencing authority are the Cherokee Nation, 
Confederated Tribes of the Umatilla Reservation, Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, 
Assiniboine & Sioux Tribes of the Fort Peck Indian Reservation, Hopi Tribe, Muscogee 
(Creek) Nation, Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community, and Tulalip Tribes. National 
Congress of American Indians, Tribal Law & Order Act (last accessed Feb. 14, 2021) 
https://www.ncai.org/tribal-vawa/resources/tribal-law-order-act.  
 40. A detailed accounting of P.L. 280 is beyond the scope of this paper. For a more 
minute discussion of P.L. 280’s implications, see generally Cohen’s Handbook, supra, § 
6.04(3); Carole E. Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction over 
Reservation Indians, 22 UCLA L. Rev. 535-594 (1974-1975). 
 41. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1162(a) (Westlaw through P.L. 116-259). 
 42. See Bryan v. Itasca Cnty, 426 U.S. 373, 385 (1976) (holding that Congress intended 
for P.L. 280 states to exert criminal and civil adjudicatory jurisdiction, but not civil 
regulatory jurisdiction that remained with the tribe); California v. Cabazon Band of Mission 
Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 208-10 (1987) (reaffirming Bryan’s reading of P.L. 280 and 
implementing a prohibitory/regulatory distinction to determine whether a law is criminal or 
regulatory in nature).  
 43. The mandatory states are California, Minnesota (except for the Red Lake 
Reservation), Nebraska, Oregon (except the Warm Springs Reservation), Wisconsin (except 
the Menominee Reservation), and Alaska (also with some exceptions). Cohen’s Handbook, 
supra, § 6.04(3)(a) nn. 45 & 46. 
 44. Id. § 6.04(3)(a).  
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 States are also permitted to retrocede all or 
part of their assumed jurisdiction to the federal government.
46
 Additionally, 




B. Environmental Federalism 
Tribal authority to regulate environmental concerns in Indian Country 
exists from two sources. “First, Indian tribes possess inherent powers to 
govern their territories,” and while federal law may limit tribal authority “in 
certain respects, tribes nonetheless retain substantial authority over matters 
affecting tribal health and welfare.”
48
 This means that tribes can enact their 
own environmental laws.
49
 “Second, Indian tribes may exercise powers 
authorized by Congress” including assuming “primary regulatory authority, 




Generally, federal environmental laws apply to Indian Country with 
either the federal government (usually the EPA) or tribal governments 
administrating or enforcing those laws.
51
 This federal authority usually does 
not replace a tribe’s inherent authority to promulgate environmental laws.
52
 
Some federal statutes (like the Safe Drinking Water Act) expressly state the 
statute was not intended to waive tribal sovereignty, while other laws (like 
the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act) will preempt tribal authority if 
the laws are not “‘substantively the same’ as federal law.”
53
 Many tribal 
governments regulate their environments through federal programs.
54
 
Programs that require EPA approval are then challenged based on “the 
federal administrative action rather than the tribal plans and standards.”
55
 
                                                                                                             
 45. Optional states are Arizona (partial jurisdiction), Florida (full jurisdiction), Idaho 
(partial jurisdiction), Iowa (partial jurisdiction), Montana (partial after some retrocessions), 
Nevada (fully retroceded), North Dakota (partial jurisdiction), South Dakota (partial 
jurisdiction), Utah (jurisdiction contingent on tribal consent, which has not occurred), and 
Washington (partial jurisdiction over Indians in Indian Country). Id. § 6.04(3)(a) n. 47. 
 46. Id. § 6.04(3)(a).  
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. § 10.01(1). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. § 10.01(2)(a). 
 52. Id. § 10.01. 
 53. Id. § 10.01(2)(b). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2021
10 Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal [Vol. 7 
  
 
Tribal governments are also subject to federal regulations and potential 




1. Federal Environmental Regulation Background 
The modern, national environmental regulation system took several 
decades to establish and occurred only because state governments failed to 
protect their environments.
57
 Up to the 1960s, the federal government 
largely treated environmental regulation as a state concern.
58
 Early federal 
environmental statutes (like the Clean Air Act of 1963 and the Solid Waste 
Disposal Act) used federal money to fund state environmental measures.
59
 
However, states were reluctant to pass stringent measures for fear that 
industries would relocate to other states.
60
 Popular support for 
environmental regulation rose in the 1960s, primarily spurred by pesticide 
use and public works projects that affected the environment.
61
 Scenic 
Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Commission, 354 F.2d 
608 (2d Cir. 1965), further spurred popular support for environmental 
regulation by making suits against federal agencies a valid engine of 
environmental activism.
62
 Percival suggests that environmental concern was 
linked to a more national consciousness, stating, “Like civil rights law, 
environmental law became federalized only after a long history of state 




The 1970s featured a major shift in federal involvement in environmental 
regulation. Federal environmental regulation in the early 1970s targeted 
federal agencies (and their projects), which were often the worst polluters.
64
 
President Nixon signed the National Environmental Policy Act in 1970, 
requiring “federal agencies to consider environmental impacts and 
alternative courses of action before taking any action likely to have a 
                                                                                                             
 56. See, e.g., Blue Legs v. BIA, 867 F.2d 1094 (8th Cir. 1989) (finding the tribal 
government liable for environmental damages); Cohen’s Handbook, supra, § 10.01(2)(c). 
 57. Robert V. Percival, Environmental Federalism: Historical Roots and Contemporary 
Models, 54 Md. L. Rev. 1141, 1146-47 (1995). 
 58. Id. at 1155-57. 
 59. Id. at 1157.  
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 1157-59. 
 62. Id. at 1159. 
 63. Id. at 1144. 
 64. Id. at 1158. 
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significant effect on the environment.”
65
 The EPA was also created in 1970 




Congress passed “more than twenty major federal environmental laws” 
in the 1970s, including the modern Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act.
67
 
These new laws were “comprehensive, national regulatory programs to 
control air and water pollution.”
68
 The Clean Air Act of 1970 contained the 
first citizen suit provision, which was a model used in future environmental 
statutes to help ensure enforcement.
69
 These programs also invoked 
federalism principles, giving states the flexibility to implement their own 
plans to reach the newly enacted federal minimums.
70
 Consequently, most 
environmental statutes did not preempt state authority.
71
 In 1974, 
Pennsylvania v. EPA, 500 F.2d 248 (3d Cir. 1974) held that federal 
environmental laws did not interfere with state sovereignty.
72
  
The 1980s saw another switch in federal environmental regulation. The 
1980 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act (“CERCLA”) is an example of the change. Specifically, 
CERCLA moved away from “a national regulatory program,” preferring 
instead to punish “hazardous substance releases” by imposing strict 
liability.
73
 According to Percival, CERCLA also changed the “cooperative 
federalism model.”
74
 Under CERCLA, the EPA could delegate cleanup 
decisions to states, but it refused to for over a decade and often 
administered state standards under CERCLA authority.
75
 Additionally, the 
Reagan administration was less sympathetic to environmental concerns than 
its predecessors.
76
 This caused Congress to seek more “prescriptive 
environmental standards” that forced the “EPA to implement . . . 
environmental laws in a more expeditious fashion.”
77
 This move towards 
                                                                                                             
 65. Id. at 1159. 
 66. Id. at 1160. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 1161. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. The Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976 was one of the rare exemptions of a 
federal statute that did preempt state authority. Id. at 1163. 
 72. Id. at 1163. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
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efficiency included establishing “new statutory deadlines for EPA action” 
and establishing “specific sanctions if deadlines were not met.”
78
  
Trends in the 1990s further limited federal environmental regulation. 
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), evidenced the Supreme 
Court’s greater willingness “to assert judicially enforceable limits on 
federal authority,” further seen in the United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 
(1995) decision.
79
 Additionally, the Clinton administration and Congress 
were concerned about unfunded mandates—environmental or other—to 
state or local governments. Executive Order 12,875 prohibited agencies 
from imposing unfunded mandates not required by the statute unless the 
agency informed the Office of Management and Budget of efforts to 
consult with state and local governments, and the agency justified the 
mandate.
80
 In 1995, Congress passed the Unfunded Mandate Reform Act 
making it much more difficult to pass mandates that would cost state or 
local governments more than $50 million annually.
81
  
2. Tribes and Environmental Federalism 
Federal environmental regulation largely ignored the role of Indian tribes 
prior to the 1980s. Tribal governments traditionally managed natural 
resources in Indian Country, but it was not until the 1980s that tribes helped 
develop and implement federal environmental programs.
82
 This earlier 
disregard for tribal roles caused lands and waters in Indian Country to be 
less protected than those of adjacent, non-Indian areas.
83
 Additionally, it 
meant tribes did not receive federal funding for environmental programs.
84
 
This federal position began to change in 1983 when President Reagan 
announced that the federal government would work with tribes “on a 
government-to-government basis” and encourage tribal self-government as 
part of his philosophy that “responsibilities and resources should be 
restored to the governments which are closest to the people served.”
85
 The 
                                                                                                             
 78. Id. at 1163-64. 
 79. Id. at 1166-67. 
 80. Id. at 1167.  
 81. Id. at 1168. 
 82. Du Bey et al., supra, 450. 
 83. Id. at 451. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Ronald Reagan, Statement in Indian Policy (January 24, 1983), Ronald Reagan 
Presidential Library & Museum Archives (last accessed Oct. 17, 2020) 
https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/archives/speech/statement-indian-policy. 
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EPA had already adopted a policy of tribal self-determination in 1980, but 
it vigorously responded to Reagan’s announcement in 1984.
86
 
The EPA’s Treatment of Tribes 
On November 8, 1984, the EPA released the EPA Policy for the 
Administration of Environmental Programs on Indian Reservations (“EPA 
Policy”). Its stated goal was to “set forth the principles that will guide the 
Agency” in working with tribal governments to address “environmental 
management” in Indian Country.
87
 The EPA recognized that tribal 
environmental regulation in Indian Country “cannot be accomplished 
immediately,” and would take “careful and conscientious work by EPA, the 
Tribes, and many others.”
88
 Additionally, it would require “changes in 
applicable statutory authorities and regulations.”
89
 The EPA wanted to 
“give special considerations to Tribal interests in making Agency policy, 
and to ensure the close involvement of Tribal Governments in making 
decision and managing environmental programs affecting reservation 
lands.”
90
 The EPA Policy set out nine principles to reach these goals that 
utilized Reagan’s government-to-government policy favoring treating tribes 
like states. 
The EPA first recognized tribal sovereignty and committed itself to 
working with tribes “on a one-to-one . . . government-to-government” 
basis.
91
 Second, the EPA recognized “tribal governments as the primary 
parties for setting standards, making environmental policy decisions and 
managing programs for reservations.”
92
 This principle outlined the EPA’s 
choice to treat tribes “as the appropriate non-Federal parties” for making 
environmental decisions in Indian Country.
93
 The EPA was committing to 
treating tribal governments like state governments, the interests and 




Third, the EPA committed to taking “affirmative steps to encourage and 
assist tribes in assuming regulatory and program management 
                                                                                                             
 86. Du Bey et al., supra, at 451 n. 1. 
 87. EPA Policy for the Admin. of Env’t Programs on Indian Reservations.  
 88. Id.  
 89. Id.  
 90. Id.  
 91. Id. (internal quotations and capitalization omitted). 
 92. Id. (capitalization omitted).  
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2021
14 Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal [Vol. 7 
  
 
responsibilities for reservation lands.”
95
 This included “providing grants 
and other assistance to Tribes similar to what we provide State 
Governments.” It also envisioned tribes assuming the same 
“responsibilities” for Indian Country that had been “traditionally delegated 
to State Governments for non-reservation lands” and under “similar 
terms.”
96
 The EPA further committed to overseeing environmental 
programs in Indian Country until tribal governments were ready and 
capable of assuming those programs. 
Fourth, the EPA committed to taking “appropriate steps to remove 
existing legal and procedural impediments” that prevented it from working 
directly with tribal governments.
97
 Fifth, the EPA committed to maintaining 
the federal government’s trust role whenever policies might affect the 
environment of Indian Country.
98
 Sixth, the EPA would “encourage 
cooperation between tribal, state and local governments,” recognizing that 
such cooperation “between equals and neighbors often serves the best 
interests of both,” especially in environmental regulation.
99
 Seventh, the 
EPA would work with other federal agencies to delineate responsibilities 
“to protect human health and the environment on reservations.”
100
  
Eighth, the EPA would “work cooperatively with Tribal leadership” to 
ensure compliance with regulations and to “provid[e] technical support and 
consultation as necessary” to ensure compliance.
101
 The EPA once more 
recognized tribal sovereignty and stated it would only directly intervene, 
either administratively or judicially, if: (1) there was “a significant threat to 
human health or the environment,” (2) direct action could “reasonably be 
expected to achieve effective results in a timely manner,” and (3) other 
methods by the federal government would fail “to correct the problem in a 
timely fashion.” However, the EPA would still intervene as normal if 
“reservation facilities [were] clearly owned or managed by private parties 
and there is no substantial Tribal interest or control involved,” but would 
attempt to work cooperatively “with the affected Tribal Government.”
102
 
Lastly, the EPA committed to including these principles and goals into its 
                                                                                                             
 95. Id. (capitalization omitted).  
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. (capitalization omitted).  
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 99. Id. (capitalization omitted). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
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The EPA actively adhered to its policy, especially the fourth point of 
lobbying to amend current environmental statutes to enable the agency to 
directly work with tribal governments.
104
 Beginning in 1986, Congress 
amended most federal environmental statutes to include TAS provisions.
105
 
Under these TAS provisions, tribal governments must generally apply to 
the EPA to determine if it is eligible to undertake primacy and administer 
the environmental programs to the federal minimum.
106
 Some statutes do 
not require a tribe to seek primacy, and newer federal environmental 
statutes contain TAS provisions when passed.
107
 Overall, most federal 
environmental statutes have some provision designating tribal TAS status 
or allowing them to apply for such status; however, the RCRA is the only 




III. The RCRA 
Like other areas of environmental regulation, solid waste disposal was 
primarily a state concern before the RCRA.
109
 The RCRA’s Congressional 
findings showed that “the problems of waste disposal . . . have become a 
matter national in scope and in concern and necessitate Federal action 
through financial and technical leadership” to develop new methods of solid 
and hazardous waste disposal.
110
 The RCRA is “enforceable through civil, 
administrative, criminal, and citizen suit remedies.”
111
 The EPA may not 
bring a suit if a state with a federally authorized program has already 
brought suit.
112
 Overall, the “RCRA dramatically increased the scope of 
federal authority over the regulation of hazardous waste.”
113
  
                                                                                                             
 103. Id.  
 104. Cohen’s Handbook, supra, §10.02(1).  
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. §10.02(2). 
 109. Du Bey, et. al., supra, at 457-58. 
 110. Id. at 457 (quoting Congressional findings at 42 U.S.C.A. § 6901(a)(4)) (emphasis 
omitted). 
 111. Linda A. Malone, 1 Envtl. Reg. of Land Use § 9:11 (2020) (Westlaw). 
 112. Id. 
 113. Du Bey et. al., supra, at 457. 
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Consistent with federalism themes, states are still free to promulgate 
their own hazardous waste programs, but the programs must first receive 
EPA authorization.
114
 A state’s first program is an interim program 
designed to determine if it is “substantially equivalent” to federal 
standards.
115
 The second, permanent program is authorized if the state’s 
program is “equivalent to the federal program, enforceable, and consistent 
with other federal and state programs.”
116
 State approved plans can receive 
federal funding for implementation and management.
117
  
The RCRA was intended to “protect groundwater from disposal of 
wastes,” and it serves a dual role of protecting groundwater and regulating 
waste disposal.
118
 The RCRA’s solid waste disposal definition includes 
“what is commonly considered solid waste as well as liquids and contained 
gases.”
119
 States are required to create two plans under the RCRA: “one for 
solid waste disposal and another for hazardous waste.”
120
 The EPA must 
create guidelines for state solid waste disposal that considers the different 
“regional, geological, hydrologic, climatic, and other circumstances” 
necessary to protect “ground and surface waters from leachate 
contamination” and the reasonable protection of both surface waters from 
runoff and ambient air quality.
121
 State plans “must distinguish between 
‘sanitary landfills’ and open dumps” and these plans must “prohibit 
establishment of new open dumps.”
122
 Further, open dumps must be shut 
down or made into sanitary landfills.  
Much of the RCRA is designed to prevent contamination.
123
 Section 
7003 concerns “remedying contamination that has already occurred” and 
applies only to solid or hazardous waste.
124
 The Administrator of the EPA 
may sue “any past or present owners . . . of treatment, storage, or disposal 
facilit[ies], any past or present generator [of waste], and any past or present 
transporter” in federal district court if these activities “present an imminent 
and substantial endangerment to health or the environment.”
125
 Section 
                                                                                                             
 114. Id. at 458. 
 115. Id. at 457 (punctuation and numbering omitted). 
 116. Id. (punctuation and numbering omitted). 
 117. Malone § 9:11, supra. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Linda A. Malone, 1 Envtl. Reg, of Land Use § 9:12 (2020) (Westlaw). 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
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7003 also may require landfill facilities and perhaps some storage facilities 
“to take corrective actions beyond facility boundaries if necessary to protect 
health and the environment” contingent upon facilities receiving permission 
for such action.
126
 Section 7003 applies strict liability and persons acting in 
corporate capacities can be “individually liable if personally involved in or 
directly responsible for conduct violating § 7003.”
127
 Additionally, state and 
local governments, and possibly federal facilities, are subject to § 7003.
128
  
A. The RCRA and Tribes 
The RCRA treats tribes as municipalities, not states, and is the only 
major federal environmental statute without a TAS provision. The RCRA 
“neither specifically authorizes Indian tribes to develop their own 
hazardous waste management programs nor explicitly provides that federal 
authority extends to Indian lands.”
129
  
The EPA interpreted the RCRA as excluding state regulatory jurisdiction 
over Indian Country.
130
 Washington State challenged this reading in 
1985.
131
 However, the EPA’s reading was upheld, precluding Washington 
State’s enforcement of the RCRA in Indian Country.
132
  
The EPA, likely adhering to its 1984 policy outlines, unilaterally 
attempted to treat the RCRA as if it had a TAS provision by stating the 
Campo Band of Mission Indian’s solid waste management plans were 
adequate in 1995.
133
 The EPA’s approval was based on its belief that it had 
the authority to declare tribal waste management plans as adequate, 
notwithstanding that the tribes’ designation as a municipality under the 
RCRA did not allow the EPA to approve these plans.
134
 The D.C. Circuit 
Court used Chevron to determine the extent of deference to the agency’s 
findings. It found that the EPA failed Chevron’s first step because the 
statute “directly [speaks] to the precise question at issue.”
135
 The court 
found that the RCRA clearly identifies tribes as municipalities, not states, 
and that the EPA “rewrote” the RCRA itself by saying the RCRA “now 
                                                                                                             
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Du Bey, et. al., supra, at 454. 
 130. Id. at 452. 
 131. Washington Department of Ecology v. EPA, 752 F.2d 1465 (9th Cir. 1985). 
 132. Du Bey, et. al., supra, at 452. 
 133. Backcountry Against Dumps v. EPA, 100 F.3d 147, 150 (D.C. Cir. 1996). 
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reads: ‘States must, and Indian tribes may, but other local governments may 
not’ adopt permit programs and submit them to the agency for review and 
approval.”
136
 The court further opined that if Congress had intended to treat 
tribes as states in the RCRA, it would have done so expressly, especially 
given explicit TAS provisions in the Clean Air Act, the Safe Drinking 
Water Act, and the Clean Water Act.
137
  
The court also acknowledged that a lack of primacy did not “strip the 
tribe of its sovereign authority to govern its own affairs,” and only caused 
the tribe to lose “the ability to take advantage of the leeway built into the 
regulations, including the ability to take site-specific factors into 
account.”
138
 The court further stated that while the RCRA’s tribal 
municipality designation might be “unfair as a policy matter, . . . the 





The lack of a TAS provision in the RCRA is significant to tribal 
governments because, notwithstanding lacking the benefits of primacy 
under the RCRA, tribal governments are still liable for compliance suits 
brought under it.
141
 In Blue Legs, Oglala Sioux tribal members sued to bring 
the Pine Ridge Reservation dumps into compliance with federal law.
142
 The 
Tribe argued it had sovereign immunity from the suit and that the Bureau of 
Indian Affairs (“BIA”) and Indian Health Service (“IHS”) were solely 
reasonable for bringing the dump into compliance.
143
 Alternatively, the 
tribe argued that if it was responsible for compliance, then remedies must 
be exhausted in tribal court before suing in federal court.
144
  
The Eighth Circuit disagreed with the tribe. It held that the tribe was 
liable for bringing the dump into federal compliance because the RCRA’s 
definition of person includes municipalities and municipalities’ definition 
includes Indian tribes.
145
 The court also found that there was sufficient 
Congressional intent to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity under the 
                                                                                                             
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. at 151. 
 139. Id.  
 140. The court may have been more comfortable adopting a textual approach and 
suggesting a Congressional remedy because sight-specific regulations were available 
because the landfill at issue was in a seismic zone, and these facts gave “the tribe the 
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 Additionally, the court held that the RCRA abrogated the general 
preference for exhaustion in tribal courts for federal question or diversity 
jurisdiction.
147
 Finally, the court rejected the tribe’s contention that the BIA 
and the IHS were solely responsible for bringing the dump into compliance 
because the tribe “established and operated” the dumps and also “generated 
waste dumped at these sites.”
148
 
B. Oklahoma Tribal TAS Status 
Oklahoma tribes have been rendered ineligible for TAS status under 
environmental laws. Specifically, Senator Inhofe’s so-called Midnight 
Rider was attached to a 2005 statute and requires tribes to negotiate with 
the State of Oklahoma to gain primacy for environmental laws, including 
the Safe Drinking Water Act that was previously amended to include a TAS 
provision.
149
 The Midnight Rider was slipped into the bill without Senate 
discussion and without consultation with Oklahoma tribes.
150
 
C. Tribal Solid Waste Programs 
Many tribal governments have implemented their own solid waste 
regulatory programs by utilizing their sovereign authority and even without 
benefitting from the RCRA funding. The following examples from the 
Cherokee, Muscogee (Creek), and Navajo Nations are intended to act as 
surveys of tribal programs. They may also serve as templates for other 
tribal governments wishing to enact their own solid waste regulations. All 
three Nations articulate similar goals in their solid waste programs. 
Specifically, the Nations envision using solid waste regulations to protect 
public health, safety, and welfare, and to conserve natural resources and the 
beauty of tribal lands.
151
  
                                                                                                             
 146. Id. at 1097 (citing (1) the tribe’s municipality status, (2) Washington Department of 
Ecology v. EPA’s finding that RCRA applied to Indian tribes, (3) and a House report 
detailing concern about American Indian children playing in reservation dumps). 
 147. Blue Legs at 1097-98; see also Nat’l Farmer Union Ins. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 
471 U.S. 845, 856-57 (1985) (concerning exhaustion requirements for federal question 
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reach these goals); Muscogee (Creek) Nation Green Government Initiative §§ 701(B)(3) & 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2021
20 Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal [Vol. 7 
  
 
1. Cherokee Nation 
This paper will look at two Cherokee Nation waste codes, the Cherokee 
Nation Solid Waste Code and the Cherokee Nation Hazardous Waste Code.  
a) Cherokee Nation Solid Waste Code 
The Environmental Protection Commission (“EPC”) can create rules for 
“permitting, posting of security, construction, operation, closure, 
maintenance and remediation of solid waste disposal sites, borrow pits and 
dredge and fill areas.”
152
 The program, at minimum, must include “the 
collection of waste paper.”
153
 Solid waste transportation rules are to be at 
least as stringent as the Department of Transportation or the Interstate 
Commerce Commission rules.
154
 The EPC and its Administrator are 
authorized to “implement and enforce” the RCRA and other federal laws 





 are not to dispose of solid waste at sites unpermitted by the 
EPC or operate sites unpermitted by the same.
157
 Additionally, persons are 
not to “knowingly transport solid waste to an unpermitted site or 
facility.”
158
 However, persons can dispose of household solid waste on their 
property if the disposal does not “create a nuisance or a hazard to the public 
health or environment” or break other laws.
159
 However, this disposal is not 
to exceed “fifty tires, junk cars or similar waste” without a permit.
160
 
The statute also includes restrictions on granting permits for solid waste 
disposal sites and facilities. Solid waste disposal sites cannot be “[w]ithin a 
locally fractured or cavernous limestone or cherry limestone bedrock,” 
cannot be within five miles of rural waste district wells that provide water 
to customers, cannot be locations that otherwise “present unacceptable risks 
to any water supply or any other beneficial use of surface water or 
groundwater,” and cannot be within one-hundred-year floodplains.
161
 
                                                                                                             
(B)(4), 101(A) (focusing heavily on recycling measures to reach these aims); and Navajo 
Solid Waste Act § 103(2). 
 152. Cherokee Nation Solid Waste Code § 605(A)(1).  
 153. Id. § 607(B).  
 154. Id. §605(A)(7).  
 155. Id. § 606.  
 156. See Id. § 603(14) (defining person to include individuals, business entities, and 
cities, towns, and municipalities). 
 157. Id. § 608(A)(1)-(2).  
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Further, solid waste landfills cannot be located within five miles of 
earthquake epicenters of 4.0 or higher on the Richter Scale or V on the 
modified Mercalli Scale.
162
 The EPC can also reject applications for sites 
presenting “an unacceptable risk to public health, safety or welfare, natural 




The statute includes additional permitting restrictions for sites. Sites can 
only accept non-hazardous industrial solid waste in areas outside of 
“principal groundwater resources or recharge areas” or “on property owned 
or operated by a person who also owns or operates a hazardous waste 
facility.”
164
 Alternatively, the site can comport to the Cherokee Nation’s 
hazardous waste requirements.
165
 Or, finally, it can store industrial solid 
waste for noncommercial use by an industry or manufacturer.
166
  
Finally, landfill owners or operators may need to submit vegetation 
plans. These plans are designed to control erosion and dust, and for 
“aesthetic enhancement.”
167
 A vegetation plan is required if the landfill is 
“over fifty (50) feet in height above natural surface contours” and “accepts 
more than two-hundred (200) tons per day of solid waste,” or if the site 
“disturbs more than one acre of land.”
168
  
b) Cherokee Nation Hazardous Waste Code 
The Cherokee Nation Hazardous Waste Code was passed in December 
of 2005. It adopts federal minimums relating to “hazardous waste, 
hazardous materials and hazardous substances.”
169
 This includes the RCRA 
minimums.
170
 The act explicitly allows hazardous waste plans to be more 
stringent than federal standards.
171
 It provides authority for Cherokee 
governmental entities to “take all actions necessary to develop, implement 
and enforce a comprehensive regulatory program for hazardous wastes and 
materials.”
172
 The Administrator of the Cherokee Nation’s hazardous waste 
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 167. Id. § 614. 
 168. Id. 
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The Cherokee Nation potentially claims authority outside of Cherokee 
Indian Country. Specifically, it claims authority over Cherokee 
Communities. These are defined as groups of people that are predominantly 
composed of Cherokee Nation members “who reside in the same 
geographic area and meet or work together on common goals.”
174
 This 
claimed authority also includes the ability to “[r]equire and approve or 
disapprove disposal plans from all persons generating . . . or shipping 
hazardous waste within, from, or into the Cherokee Nation.”
175
 
Additionally, the EPC is given authority over potentially wide geographic 
areas to regulate “any existing” hazardous waste disposal site that threatens 
to “migrate into waters of the Nation or otherwise cause adverse impacts on 
public health, safety or the environment.”
176
 This authority includes 
requiring “closure, cleanup, restoration, or such protective activities as 
double liners and leachate detection and collection measures.”
177
  
The Commission can issue permits and create rules “relating to the 
construction, operation, closure, post-closure, maintenance and monitoring 
of hazardous waste facilities.”
178
 However, new permits for hazardous 
waste sites cannot be approved after January 1, 2006,
179
 and existing 
disposal sites are prohibited from receiving or incinerating hazardous waste 
in Cherokee Nation after January 1, 2006.
180
 The EPC may also 
“[p]romulgate such rules as they deem necessary or appropriate” to 
implement this statute.
181
 Specifically, the EPC may restrict or prohibit land 
disposal of hazardous waste, including “landfills, surface impoundments, 
waste piles, deep injection wells, land treatment facilities, salt dome and 
bed formations and underground mines or caves.”
182
 The EPC is also 
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 174. Id. § 1303(2).  
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responsible for enforcing its own rules and the statute’s requirements.
183
 
This responsibility includes determining and enforcing penalties for 
violating this statute and the EPC’s rules.
184
 Further, the EPC is the final 
arbitrator of administrative appeals relating to hazardous waste rules.
185
 
The Administrator is to make “information obtained by the Nation 
regarding hazardous waste facilities and sites available to the public in . . . 
the same manner” as would occur if the EPA carried out the program.
186
 
2. Muscogee (Creek) Nation 
The Muscogee (Creek) Nation’s solid waste plan involves several parts, 
including permitting, building codes, recycling, and solid waste collection, 
the latter two being the focus of this survey. The Muscogee (Creek) Nation 
potentially claims broad civil regulatory jurisdiction because the statute 




a) Recycling Initiatives 
Recycling efforts are the foundational principal of the Muscogee (Creek) 
Nation’s solid waste programs. Specifically, it requires “recycling of 
recyclable materials to the fullest extent possible by the government of the 
Muscogee (Creek) Nation and individuals or entities employed by the 
Nation and by the citizens of the Nation.”
188
 The statute requires 
governmental buildings to separate “designated recyclable materials from 
other refuse . . . without regard to whether the building’s solid waste is 
collected by municipalities within the Muscogee (Creek) Nation’s 
jurisdiction.”
189
 Those buildings that receive “city solid waste collection 
                                                                                                             
 183. Id. § 1304(A)(2).  
 184. Id. § 1304(A)(13).  
 185. Id. § 1304(A)(4).  
 186. Id. § 1304(B)(12).  
 187. Muscogee (Creek) Nation Green Government Initiative 40 § 5-103; see also id. § 5-
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services” are required to separate recyclable materials from other refuse per 
the statute’s requirements.
190
 Those that do not receive “city solid waste 
collection” are still required to separate recyclable materials from other 
refuse, and are required to develop a recycling plan to be approved by the 
Commissioner.
191
 The Commission may request recycling plans from “[a]ll 
commercial or governmental entities.”
192
  
The Nation reasoned that an effective recycling program requires access 
to recycling receptacles. The Nation planned on providing recycling 
receptacles for residential dwellings.
193
 However, commercial owners are 
“responsible for the costs associated with separating recyclable 
materials.”
194
 Recycling receptacles are also available from the Nation for 
special events, but the number of recycling receptacles must equal the 




The Nation also focused on education to further its recycling goals. All 
the Nation’s “governmental establishments” are responsible for educating 
“employees and/or resident users and patrons” of the recycling program’s 
requirements.
196
 This includes “written instructions” for materials to be 
recycled, how these materials are to be prepared, how to use the collection 
system, and updates to the programs.
197
 This last educational requirement is 
especially important because the statute reserves the Commission’s right to 
amend the recyclable material list, even if it conflates with other statutes.
198
 
This likely requires governmental entities to stay abreast of changes in the 
Nation’s recycling code to remain within compliance. 
b) Solid Waste Regulations 
Of the three Nations surveyed, the Muscogee (Creek) Nation’s plan puts 
the most discretion in the hands of an administrative agency. The Office of 
Environment Services (“OES”) is authorized to “[e]stablish requirements 
for disposal, transfer, transport, treatment and storage of solid waste” to 
“ensure public safety and protection of the environment to the greatest 
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 It can also “[r]equire methods of pollution prevention, 
waste reduction, conservation, avoidance or mitigation of impacts,”
200
 and 
establish “processes and procedures for the sampling and submission of 
environmental impact statements.”
201
 Further, it can create rules for solid 
waste transportation that must be at least as stringent as those established by 
the United States Department of Transportation or the Interstate Commerce 
Commission.
202
 Additionally, the OES can establish “comprehensive solid 
waste management rules and best management practices.”
203
 It can further 
create standards for cleaning up “groundwater, surface waters, or 
contaminated soils resulting from releases, spills or other activities”
204
 and 
it can enforce applicable federal laws and regulations.
205
 Finally, the OES is 
required to “promulgat[e] rules and regulations” that “encourage and 
promote recycling and reuse of recoverable materials” because such efforts 
are “necessary for the public safety, health, interest and economic welfare” 
and these recycling efforts can “substantially reduce production and 




3. Navajo Nation 
The Navajo Nation’s regulations are the most comprehensive of those 
surveyed. This paper looks at two statutes: the Navajo Nation Solid Waste 
Act (“Solid Waste Act”) and the Navajo Nation Solid Waste Regulations.  
a) Navajo Nation Solid Waste Act  
The Navajo Nation, like the other Nations surveyed, claims broad 
authority. The Solid Waste Act applies “to all persons and all property 
within the Navajo Nation,”
207
 except those with whom there are covenants 
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The Navajo Nation Environmental Protection Agency is the primary 
organ for enforcing this statute.
209
 The Director of this agency is authorized 
to “prescribe such regulations as are necessary to carry out his/her 
functions” under the act; to enforce the provisions of the act; issue permits, 
assess fees, and conduct investigations, among other tasks; “accept, receive 
and administer grants or other funds” from groups to administer the act’s 
purposes; and “perform such other activities as the Director may find 
necessary to carry out his/her functions under this chapter.”
210
 Specifically, 
the Director may create regulations for “solid waste landfills, transfer 
stations, composting facilities, collection and transportation of solid waste 
and recycling.”
211
 But the Director’s promulgated rules must be at least as 
stringent as those under the RCRA.
212
  
The statute allows variances to the Director’s rules under certain 
circumstances. Owners may petition the Director for variances if “hardships 
[are] caused by, but not limited to, isolation and extreme weather 
conditions,” but the variances cannot “endanger public health, safety, 
welfare or the environment” and cannot violate 40 C.F.R. Parts 257 or 
258.
213
 Variances are not intended to be permanent or a circumvention of 
the rules: owners/operators must create “a detailed plan for the completion 
of corrective steps needed to conform” to the statute and the Director’s 
rules, there must be a “fixed term for the variance,” and the Director may 
periodically inspect the facility.
214







 variances.  
The statute establishes requirements and procedures for landfill permits. 
Permits for solid waste facilities are to be for fixed terms not exceeding 
thirty years.
218
 If a facility does not comply with the statute or the 
Director’s rule, then the permit must specify when the facility must 
complete necessary modifications.
219
 Additionally, the Director must allow 
                                                                                                             
 209. Id. § 103(3).  
 210. Id. §§ 107(A)(1)-(2), (4)-(5), (7), and (11)-(12).  
 211. Id. § 301(A).  
 212. Id. § 107(A) (suggesting also that the Director should consider the factors 
established by RCRA Subtitle D).  
 213. Navajo Nation Solid Waste Act § 302(A) and Navajo Nation Solid Waste 
Regulations § 106(A).  
 214. Navajo Nation Solid Waste Act §§ 301(B)(1)-(3).  
 215. Id. § 301(C). 
 216. Id. § 301(D). 
 217. Id. 
 218. Id. § 403(A).  
 219. Id.  
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applicants time to remedy deficiencies in their application.
220
 The Director 
may revoke permits for failure to comply with the permit’s terms, failure to 
comply with the statute’s regulations, or “fraud, deceit” or submitting 
“inaccurate information.”
221
 The Director is required to publicly disclose 
the “final determination regarding any permit under this chapter” and must 
schedule a public hearing if the Director receives a written request for one 
“within 15 days of publication” of the public disclosure.
222
  
Additionally, the statute contains procedures for the Director’s creation 
of rules. The Director must give public notice of proposed rules, including 
allowing the public to state its views orally or in writing.
223
 The Director is 
also required to respond in writing to “each significant [public] 
comment.”
224
 The Director’s rules are also subject to the Navajo Supreme 
Court’s review.
225
 This review has important implications. Judicial review 
for the Director’s final actions are not available if the action could have 
been reviewed by the Navajo Supreme Court but was not.
226
 This 
prohibition does not apply if the rule was objected to “with reasonable 
specificity” during the public comment period.
227
 Further, if the objection 
was “impracticable to raise” within the public comment period, the Director 
must “convene a proceeding” to reconsider the regulation within the 
judicial review period.
228
 If this proceeding does not occur, then the Navajo 
Supreme Court may hear the objection.
229
 Courts may reverse a Director’s 
final action that is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise 
not in accordance with the law”; “in excess of statutory jurisdiction, 
authority, or limitations or short of statutory right”; “outside of procedural 
requirements”; or “unsupported by substantial evidence.”
230
 
While this statute gives the Director wide discretion for creating rules, it 
also contains certain limitations. It is illegal to “dispose of any solid waste 
in a manner that will harm the environment, endanger the public health, 
safety and welfare or create a public nuisance” or somewhere “other than a 
                                                                                                             
 220. Id.  
 221. Navajo Nation Solid Waste Act § 404 and Navajo Nation Solid Waste Regulations 
§§ 509(A)-(C).  
 222. Navajo Nation Solid Waste Act § 404(B).  
 223. Id. § 601(A)(1).  
 224. Id. § 601(A)(2).  
 225. Id. § 602(A).  
 226. Id. § 601 (B)(1).  
 227. Id. § 602(B)(2).  
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facility which is in compliance with these regulations.”
231
 This prohibition 
excludes the “on-site disposal of on-site generated solid waste from a 
family ranch, camp or farm” if it does not “create a public health or 
environmental hazard or public nuisance.”
232
 Further, one must have a 
permit to “construct, operate or modify a solid waste landfill facility” unless 
it meets the above § 201(B) exception of a family ranch, camp, or farm.
233
 
Additionally, “bulk or non-containerized liquids” cannot by disposed of in 
solid waste facilities.
234
 It is also illegal to interfere with or prohibit 
“inspection, entry or monitoring[ ] activities.”
235
 Owner/operators cannot 
openly burn solid waste at their facilities.
236
 Owner/operators can be 
required to keep records regarding installation or monitoring of equipment, 
audit procedures, and emission samples,
237
 and these records must be 
publicly available unless it qualifies as a trade secret.
238
 
The Navajo Solid Waste Act invokes civil regulatory, civil adjudicatory, 
and criminal jurisdiction. The Director is authorized to issue and serve 
compliance orders, administrative penalty orders, or bring civil or criminal 
action on persons “conducting an activity that threatens human health or the 
environment” or who have violated the statute or the Director’s orders.
239
 
Civil actions include injunctions.
240
 Criminal penalties require an 
intentional mens rea and invoke fines between $500 and $5,000 per day per 
violation and/or 180 days of imprisonment.
241
 Administrative order 
penalties can be “up to $10,000 per day per violation” but are not to exceed 
$100,000 total.
242
 Additionally, those who have “consistently violated any 
requirements or prohibitions” can be prohibited from operating solid waste 
                                                                                                             
 231. Id. §§ 201(A)(1)-(2).  
 232. Id. § 201(B).  
 233. Id. § 202.  
 234. Id. § 201(A)(4).  
 235. Navajo Nation Solid Waste Act § 201(A)(6); see Navajo Nation Solid Waste 
Regulations § 201.  
 236. Navajo Nation Solid Waste Act § 203 and Navajo Nation Solid Waste Regulations § 
203.  
 237. Navajo Solid Waste Act § 501(A).  
 238. Id. § 501(C). The statute does not define trade secret, but assuming it follows the 
general American legal meaning, it would be information that “has economic value, remains 
secret . . . and [for which] reasonable security measures are taken.” Stephen M. McJohn, 
Intellectual Property: Examples & Explanations 516 (6th ed. 2019).  
 239. Navajo Solid Waste Act § 502(A).  
 240. Id. § 502(E). 
 241. Id. § 503(B).  
 242. Id. § 504(A).  
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol7/iss1/2
2021]      Impact of RCRA & McGirt on Trial Solid Waste Regulations 29 
 
 
facilities or contracting for the same.
243
 Cash penalties received from 




Additionally, the statute authorizes citizen suits. They can be raised 
against anyone that violates the statute or Director-promulgated rules 
except the Navajo Nation or its instrumentalities, but tribal enterprises may 
be sued.
245
 Citizen suits are permitted for “past or present handling, storage, 
treatment, transportation, or disposal of any solid waste . . . [that] present[s] 
an imminent and substantial endangerment to health or the environment” 
and violate the statute or the Director’s rules.
246




b) Navajo Nation Solid Waste Regulations 
The Navajo Nation Solid Waste Regulations (“Regulations”) were 
passed after the Navajo Nation Solid Waste Act. The Regulations re-
codifies portions of the Act but also contains additional rules.  
The Solid Waste Regulations prohibit landfills in certain areas. These 
include wetlands, flood plains, the habitats of threatened or endangered 
species, and prime farmland.
248
 Additionally, landfills are prohibited in 
“[h]istorically, archeologically or culturally significant sites” unless the 
landfill complies with the Navajo Cultural Resources Protection Act and 
other tribal and federal laws.
249
 Further, landfills are prohibited on seismic 
zones unless the owner/operator demonstrates that “all structures . . . are 
designed to resist maximum horizontal acceleration in lithified earth 
material for the site.”
250
 
                                                                                                             
 243. Id. § 502(A).  
 244. Id. §§ 503(E)(3) and 505(E). 
 245. Navajo Nation Solid Waste Act § 505(A)(1).  
 246. Id.  
 247. See Navajo Nation Solid Waste Act § 505(B)(1) (requiring sixty days’ notice to the 
Director before filing a citizen suit for violations of the statute or the Director’s rules and 
preempting citizen suits if the Director is “diligently prosecuting an administrative or a civil 
action”); § 105(B)(2) (requiring ninety days’ notice for citizen suits for actions that do not 
violate the statute or rule but that allegedly harm health or the environment, and preempting 
the citizen suit if the Director is pursuing an administrative or civil action); and § 505(C)(2) 
(allowing the Director to intervene in citizen suits).  
 248. Navajo Nation Solid Waste Regulations § 402(A)(1).  
 249. Id. § 402(A)(5).  
 250. Id. § 402(A)(7).  
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Landfills are further restricted under the Regulations. First, open 
dumping is prohibited.
251
 Next, solid waste landfills are required to use 
methane gas monitoring and control systems.
252
 Landfills are to be located 
and operated to avoid “a public nuisance or potential hazard to public 
health, welfare or the environment and in a manner to control disease 
vectors and odors.”
253
 All landfills must also have a contingency plan 
“designed to minimize hazards to human health or the environment from 
fires, explosions or any unplanned sudden or non-sudden release of 




The Director is empowered to grant variances if they do not “endanger 
the public health or harm the environment.”
255
 However, the Regulations 
provide an additional barrier to issuing variances: the owner/operator must 
establish that the variances do not harm public health or the environment by 
clear and convincing evidence.
256
 Additionally, variances are not to be 
granted “until the Director has considered the relative interests of the 




The Director is also given additional authority under the Regulations. 
Either the Director or Health Advisor can “enter any solid waste disposal, 
collection, transfer station or composting facility” to inspect or investigate 
(including the vehicles or equipment of solid waste transporters), take 




The Regulations also contain additional requirements for permits. Navajo 
Nation permits are granted conditionally on the Director’s right to inspect 
the facility and the facility’s records.
259
 Permits are further conditioned on 
the owner/operator’s consent to Navajo jurisdiction.
260
 Permit applications 
are also public record, with the public receiving the right to comment on the 
granting and modification of an application, and corrective actions against 
                                                                                                             
 251. Id. § 206.  
 252. Id. § 403(E).  
 253. Id. § 404(A)(2)(a).  
 254. Id. § 404(C)(1).  
 255. Id. § 106(A).  
 256. Id. § 106(B)(2).  
 257. Id. § 106(B)(3).  
 258. Id. §§ 302(A)-(B). 
 259. Id. § 504.  
 260. Id.  
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 A permit is unnecessary to “own, operate or maintain a 
solid waste transfer station.”
262
 A composting facility requires a permit 
unless it “occupies less than 5 acres, uses only water or an inoculant as an 
additive and utilizes no more than 50% manure in the final mix, and does 
not compost treated sewage sludge or solid waste.”
263
 
Transporters of solid waste must use vehicle “covers or enclosures to 
prevent solid waste from being released during collection/transportation” 
and collection and transportation must satisfy the EPA Guideline for Solid 
Waste Storage and Collection.
264
 Solid waste generators must provide 
containers for the waste unless it is “construction/demolition waste, yard 
waste and white goods.”
265
 “Storage facilities shall be insect-, rodent- and 
leak-proof” and construction and yard waste and white goods must be 
stored “to prevent insect and rodent harborage, environmental and safety 




McGirt was a 5-4 Supreme Court decision that found a large section of 
eastern Oklahoma—the Muscogee (Creek) Nation—is still Indian Country 
because Congress failed to disestablish the reservation statutorily. It also 
limited the application of contemporaneous events and demographics to 
show disestablishment.
267
 The re-recognition of Indian Country means the 
Muscogee (Creek) Nation could exert civil regulatory jurisdiction 
(including solid waste regulation) over non-Indians in eastern Oklahoma. It 
also raises the possibility that other tribes’ reservations were not 
disestablished via explicit Congressional statute.  
A. Background 
The Petitioner was convicted of “three serious sexual offenses” in an 
Oklahoma state court.
268
 He argued that the state lacked jurisdiction 
because he was a tribal member of the Seminole Nation and because his 
                                                                                                             
 261. Id. § 505.  
 262. Id. § 702.  
 263. Id. § 802.  
 264. Id. § 902 (citing to 40 C.F.R. 243). 
 265. Navajo Nation Solid Waste Regulations § 903(A). 
 266. Id. § 903(B).  
 267. But cf. Solem v. Bartlett, 465 U.S. 463 (1984) (suggesting that there could be 
situations where contemporaneous events and demographics could evidence 
disestablishment). 
 268. McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452, 2459 (2020). 
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crimes took place in Indian Country, specifically on the Muscogee (Creek) 
Reservation in northeastern Oklahoma.
269
 He argued, therefore, that the 
federal courts had jurisdiction under the MCA.
270
 The MCA gives the 
federal government exclusive jurisdiction over certain enumerated crimes 
(including Petitioner’s) committed in Indian Country by an American 
Indian.
271
 The parties all agreed that Petitioner’s “crimes were committed 
on lands described as the Creek Reservation in an 1866 treaty and federal 
statute.”
272
 The Petitioner argued this was still Indian Country.
273
 Oklahoma 
argued that the land was no longer a reservation and had lost its Indian 
Country status.
274
 The question before the Court was whether lands 
promised to the Creek Nation remained “an Indian reservation for purposes 
of federal criminal law.”
275
 
B. Discussion and Holding 
1. Disestablishment 
Oklahoma first argued that Congress created no reservation, but the 
Supreme Court held that Congress had established a Creek Reservation in 
what is now Oklahoma. It was established “[i]n a series of treaties” that 
“establish[ed] boundary lines” for the Creek’s “‘permanent home.’”
276
 
Congress promised that the land “will forever” be secured and guaranteed 
to the Creeks.
277
 The title to the land was guaranteed to the Creeks “‘so long 




Oklahoma argued that Congress did not create a reservation because the 
treaty initially granting the land did not call it a reservation.
279
 However, the 
Court previously found that similar contemporaneous treaty language had 
created reservations.
280
 Further, a later 1866 treaty that reduced Muscogee 
(Creek) holdings explicitly called the remaining lands a reservation and 
                                                                                                             
 269. Id. 
 270. Id.  
 271. Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a)).  
 272. Id. at 2460. 
 273. Id. 
 274. Id.  
 275. Id. at 2459.  
 276. Id. at 2460. 
 277. Id.  
 278. Id.  
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stated that this reservation “would ‘be forever set apart as a home for said 
Creek Nation.’”
281
 Therefore, Congress did create a reservation for the 
Creek Nation because it was intended to be a permanent home and meant as 
a place where the Creek Nation was “assured a right to self-government” 
that lied “outside both the legal jurisdiction and geographic boundaries of 
any State.”
282
 To the Court, this meant that “[u]nder any definition” the 
Muscogee (Creek) lands were established as a reservation.
283
 
Oklahoma’s next argument was that if a reservation was created for the 
Muscogee (Creek) Nation, it no longer existed. The Court admitted that the 
land “once divided and held by the Tribe . . . is now fractured into 
pieces.”
284
 Additionally, much of the land belongs “to persons unaffiliated 
with the Nation.”
285
 However, to answer whether the Muscogee (Creek) 
Reservation still exists, the Court may look only to one place: “the acts of 
Congress.”
286
 Under Solem, only Congress can disestablish reservations, 
and its intent to do so must be clear, even if disestablishment requires no 
“particular form of words.”
287
 While Congress may “breach its own 
promises and treaties” vis-à-vis reservations, that power “belongs to 
Congress alone” and courts cannot “lightly . . . infer” disestablishment.
288
  
The Court required disestablishment to be shown through a 
Congressional statute, and as such, several of Oklahoma’s arguments about 
non-statutory disestablishment were rejected. The Creek Allotment Act of 
1901 did not disestablish the reservation because allotment lacked a 
“‘present and total surrender of all tribal interests’ in the affected land”; 
courts had previously rejected state claims that “allotments automatically 
ended reservations”; and Indian Country’s definition “expressly 
contemplates private land ownership within reservation boundaries” when it 
includes “‘land within the limits of any Indian reservation . . . 
notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way 
running through the reservation.”
289
 Intrusions on the Creek’s self-
                                                                                                             
 281. McGirt at 2460.  
 282. Id. at 2462.  
 283. Id.  
 284. Id.  
 285. Id.  
 286. Id.  
 287. Id. (citation omitted).  
 288. Id. (citation omitted).  
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governance, including abolishing tribal courts, requiring Presidential 
approval for tribal ordinances affecting tribal land or tribal property, and the 
abolishment of the Creek tribal government in 1906 did not disestablish the 
reservation.
290
 The tribe, in fact, maintained “significant sovereign 
functions over the lands in question,” including taxation, schooling, tribal 
ordinances not affecting land, and overseeing the allotment process.
291
  
Oklahoma’s assertion that Solem allowed contemporary events or later 
events and demographics to evidence disestablishment was rejected by the 
Court. The Court only recognized one step in Solem: Congressional statutes 
stating there was disestablishment.
292
 The only reason courts should consult 
“contemporaneous usages, customs, and practices” is to “shed light” on the 
ambiguous language used by Congress when disestablishing a 
reservation.
293
 Those events and facts cannot show disestablishment facially 
because they have “‘limited interpretive value’” and are the “‘least 
compelling form of evidence.’”
294
  
Oklahoma also argued that the Creek land constituted a dependent Indian 
community, not a reservation.
295
 However, the Court remarked that this 
semantic argument did not change the law: Indian Country includes 
dependent Indian communities that would still preclude Oklahoma from 
exercising criminal jurisdiction in Indian Country.
296
 Oklahoma then asked 
the Court not only to rule that Muscogee (Creek) Nation existed as a 
dependent Indian community, but that this status made the land easier to 
disestablish than if it was a reservation.
297
 But the Court refused. The 
Muscogee (Creek) Nation had a reservation, in part because “a host of 
federal statutes” repeatedly referenced a “Creek Reservation,” while other 
statutes promised the Creeks a “permanent home” that would be “forever 
set apart” and where the Creeks would be “secured in the unrestricted rights 
of self-government.”
298
 The Court further rejected Oklahoma’s contention 
that the Creeks did not have a reservation because they originally owned the 
land in fee. Owning the land in fee, according to the Court, still satisfied the 
                                                                                                             
 290. Id. at 2465-66. The majority believed his latter event tended to show that Congress 
did not disestablish the reservation via allotment in 1901 and that Presidential review would 
suggest the tribe still had authority to legislate. Id. at 2466.  
 291. Id.  
 292. Id. at 2468.  
 293. Id.  
 294. Id. at 2469 (citation omitted).  
 295. Id. at 2474.  
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condition “that a reservation must be land ‘reserved from sale’” because the 
fee land could still not be given to others without confiscating the land.
299
 
The Court also rejected the “scattered references” that called the Creek 
lands something besides a reservation because “the most authoritative 
evidence of the Creek’s relationship to the land” is “the treaties and statutes 
that promised the land to the Creeks in the first place.”
300
 These laws 
pointed to a reservation, and the Court rejected “the untenable suggestion 
that, when the federal government agreed to offer more protection for tribal 
lands [by granting the Creeks fee title], it really provided less.”
301
 Overall, 




2. Oklahoma’s Exemption from the Major Crimes Act 
Failing to prove that the Muscogee (Creek) reservation was already 
disestablished or non-existent, Oklahoma alternatively argued that it was 
exempt from the MCA. Oklahoma argued this exemption was based on the 
interplay between Oklahoma’s unique territorial history and its enabling 
act. The historical argument began with Oklahoma being composed of two 
territories: Indian Territory in the east and Oklahoma Territory in the west. 
In 1897, federal courts were given exclusive criminal jurisdiction over 
Indian Territory.
303
 Additionally, the 1898 Curtis Act abolished tribal courts 
in Indian Territory.
304
 According to Oklahoma, these facts had some sort of 
bearing on the intention behind the enabling act vis-à-vis criminal 
jurisdiction. Oklahoma argued that when its enabling act transferred all 
pending cases from federal territorial courts to state courts, it inherited “the 
federal territorial courts’ sweeping authority to try Indians for crimes 
committed on reservations.”
305
 However, the Court stated the enabling act 
“sent state-law cases to state court and federal-law cases to federal court,” 
the latter including crimes arising under the MCA.
306
 Oklahoma further 
contended that because it continued to try cases falling under the MCA, it 
inherited criminal jurisdiction in Indian Country; however, the Court 
asserted that Oklahoma’s “own courts have acknowledged that the State’s 
                                                                                                             
 299. Id. at 2475. 
 300. Id. at 2476. 
 301. Id.  
 302. Id. at 2475. 
 303. Id. at 2476. 
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 305. Id.  
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historic practices deviated in meaningful ways from the MCA’s terms.”
307
 
Oklahoma’s unilateral assumption of criminal jurisdiction in Indian 
Country did not establish an MCA exemption for Oklahoma.
308
  
The Court further rejected Oklahoma’s policy concerns over re-
recognizing a large swathe of Indian Country. Specifically, Oklahoma was 
concerned that the majority’s ruling could overturn “an untold number of 
convictions.”
309
 However, the Court believed that its ruling would only 
disrupt a small number of convictions, and under McBratney, Oklahoma 
would still have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indian on non-Indian crime 
in Indian Country.
310
 Additionally, Oklahoma’s assertion that the MCA did 
not apply there could also overturn federal convictions secured under MCA 
authority.
311
 The concern of overturned convictions was largely overlooked: 
“In any event, the magnitude of a legal wrong is no reason to perpetuate 
it.”
312
 The Court held that the MCA applies to Oklahoma, in large part 
because Congress never specifically expanded Oklahoma’s criminal 
jurisdiction to include Indian Country.
313
 
3. McGirt’s Applicability to Other Tribes and to Civil Jurisdiction 
Another of Oklahoma’s rejected concerns was that the majority ruling 
would re-expand Indian Country. Specifically, Oklahoma was concerned 
that other courts could use this ruling and tribal treaties to find “that 
perhaps as much as half of its land and roughly 1.8 million residents could 
wind up within Indian country.”
314
 The Court did not reject that possibility 
out of hand, but stated that “[e]ach tribe’s treaties must be considered on 
their own terms.”
315
 This raises the possibility that allotted areas that were 
not explicitly disestablished could be re-recognized as Indian Country. 
Future analysis relying on McGirt would need to look specifically at the 
laws to determine if disestablishment occurred.  
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 309. Id. at 2479.  
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 312. Id. at 2480.  
 313. Id. at 2478. 
 314. Id. at 2478-79.  
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The Supreme Court refused to discuss McGirt’s applicability to civil 
adjudicatory and regulatory law. The Supreme Court stated that the 
question before it was the MCA’s definition of Indian Country.
316
 However, 
the Court did not foreclose the possibility of using McGirt to expand civil 
jurisdiction into re-recognized Indian Country, because while “often 
nothing requires other civil statutes or regulations to rely on definitions 
found in the criminal law . . . many federal civil laws and regulations do 
currently borrow from § 1151 when defining the scope of Indian 
country.”
317
 But, in dicta, one district court judge has already expressed the 
belief that McGirt should be read narrowly, stating, “By its terms, McGirt 
only applies to defendants who commit certain crimes within the Muscogee 
(Creek) Nation Reservation.”
318
 Notwithstanding that opinion, applying 
criminal decisions to civil jurisdiction has been supported by the Supreme 
Court: “Although this definition by its terms relates only to federal criminal 




 V. McGirt’s Potential Impact and Policy Recommendations 
McGirt could be used to re-recognize Indian Country, but few tribes may 
have the Muskogee Creek’s unique statutory history to support re-
recognition. Tribes with re-recognized Indian Country could also expand 
their civil regulatory programs, including solid waste, into those areas. This 
possibility may be enough to encourage Congress to amend the RCRA to 
include a TAS provision. Congress should also revoke the Oklahoma TAS 
exemption. Finally, tribal governments should establish their own solid 
waste regulations, including efforts to cooperate with state and local 
governments to create more nationally comprehensive solid waste 
regulation. 
A. McGirt’s Impact on Tribal Solid Waste Regulation 
McGirt poses a puzzle for tribal civil regulatory jurisdiction moving 
forward. First, one must wonder how much land will be re-recognized as 
                                                                                                             
 316. McGirt at 2480.  
 317. Id. (emphasis added); see also Salas v. Off. of Hawai’ian Aff. Bd. of Tr., 2020 WL 
4590731, 1 (M.D. Ga.) (distinguishing McGirt: Plaintiff committed no crime but was denied 
benefits from a state agency and then attempted “to challenge the legitimacy of Hawai’i’s 
state government by citing McGirt). 
 318. Barnett v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 2021 WL 325716, 3-5 (W.D. Okla.) (dismissing 
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Indian Country. McGirt clarified Solem and clearly stated that questions 
about disestablishment will be based on the legislation disestablishing a 
reservation. But Congress clearly disestablished many reservations other 
than the Muskogee Creek’s, meaning there may be a small number of re-
recognized reservations. 
Second, tribal responses to McGirt will largely depend on how courts 
read it moving forward. Courts could take a literal view of McGirt’s posed 
question: defining Indian Country under the MCA. Additionally, courts that 
are unfamiliar with the nuances of Indian law and tribal jurisdiction could 
assume that because McGirt is a criminal jurisdiction case and Indian 
Country is defined under the federal criminal code, McGirt is inapplicable 
to civil jurisdiction. Such a limited reading is not wholly clear from the 
case. The Supreme Court also has previously stated that while Indian 
Country is defined under the criminal code, it applies to civil contexts, as 
well. Finally, the death of Justice Ginsburg, a member of the McGirt 
majority, leads to some unpredictability about applying McGirt to the civil 
field moving forward.  
Assuming more land is re-recognized as Indian Country and assuming 
there is a general acceptance that tribal civil regulatory jurisdiction 
(including solid waste programs) could be extended there, tribes should 
craft their programs under Montana’s requirements. Specifically, 
Montana’s second prong of protecting health could be a justification for 
expanding tribal solid waste programs, but likely only if the tribal program 
is more stringent than what is already in place. Additionally, the Muscogee 
(Creek) Nation and other nations possibly impacted by McGirt should be 
weary of potential RCRA liability traps. Specifically, tribes—already liable 
for failures to adhere to the RCRA standards—may face liability for areas 
without adequate solid waste programs that were not within tribal control 
before re-recognition. At the very least, a potential lawsuit along those lines 
could be costly. One possible response (discussed more fully below) is to 
create tribal solid waste management programs that establish federal 
standards as a minimum. 
B. Policy Recommendations  
1. Congressional Recommendations 
First, Congress should amend the RCRA to include a TAS provision for 
tribal governments. This brings the RCRA into line with other federal 
environmental statutes that have TAS provisions. Specifically, both the 
Safe Drinking Water Act and the RCRA’s purposes are to protect the 
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 and there is little policy rationale for excluding the 
RCRA from having a TAS provision when the Safe Drinking Water Act 
includes a TAS provision.  
Amending the RCRA better fulfills Congress’s trust responsibility 
towards tribes, especially financially, and increases tribal self-
determination. Tribes are put in a difficult position because they must 
maintain the RCRA-mandated protections to avoid liability but do not 
receive funding to do so. By stacking the financial deck against tribes, 
Congress has failed in its guardian role. Additionally, amending the RCRA 
also increases tribal sovereignty and self-determination. Specifically, it 
would enable tribes to work directly with the EPA to develop plans that 
meet a tribe’s specific needs. It also better encourages tribes to develop 
expertise in the fields of solid and hazardous waste management.  
Amending the RCRA to treat tribes like states also increases the 
likelihood of more comprehensive national environmental programs. This is 
because federal funding could allow more effective implementation of the 
RCRA requirements by tribes. It enables tribes to establish federal 
minimum standards and more effectively implement programs that fit the 
needs of their specific geographic locations and their members’ needs. This, 
in turn, reduces the risk of gaps in environmental protection over substantial 
segments of the nation, especially if the gaps exist for financial reasons.  
Second, Congress should repeal the Oklahoma tribal TAS prohibition. 
This is because it serves no real purpose. It hampers the EPA’s ability “to 
continue [its] close relationship with tribal nations,” specifically for statutes 
that already have TAS provisions.
321
 It also hampers the EPA’s core 
responsibility—upholding the nation’s environmental laws—by removing 
its involvement among a sizable proportion of Oklahoma’s population.
322
 
Further, it reduces tribal self-determination in Oklahoma by requiring tribes 
to negotiate directly with Oklahoma for primacy. This negotiation 
requirement runs contrary to how environmental statutes generally work. It 
is true that primacy often requires applying to the EPA, but this application 
process generally has specific metrics that the program must reach. 
Negotiating with the state raises the possibility that primacy is based on 
something besides the effectiveness of a tribe’s environmental plan. This, in 
turn, increases the risk of regulatory gaps in Oklahoma’s Indian Country. 
This possibility directly contradicts the purpose of federal environmental 
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laws and implicates the very reason the federal government became actively 
involved in environmental regulation: failures to regulate state 
environments. But in this case, the state could place external barriers on 
effective environmental regulation to the determinant of Oklahomans: 
American Indian and non-Indian alike. 
Additionally, Oklahoma tribes would greatly benefit from TAS 
provisions. This is because Oklahoma has such a large American Indian 
population,
323
 because Indian Country is such a substantial portion of the 
state,
324
 and because of the strength of many of Oklahoma’s tribes.  
Finally, the Midnight Rider circumvented how Congress interacts with 
Oklahoma tribes.
325
 By requiring Oklahoma tribes to negotiate for primacy 
with the state,
326
 the Midnight Rider acts like a substitute for partial P.L. 
280 jurisdiction, which was accomplished without tribal consent. This 
legislative gamesmanship is contrary to Congress’s guardian role. The 
Midnight Rider is an attack on tribal self-determination and sovereignty. It 
does nothing to protect tribal environments in Oklahoma.  
2. Tribal Recommendations 
Tribes should actively seek to implement solid waste regulations and 
programs. First, tribes should carefully delineate their regulatory authority. 
While tribal sovereignty exists and many Supreme Court decisions have 
recognized it, tribes often face tension when dealing with state 
governments. By properly defining and claiming regulatory authority 
within legally recognized boundaries, tribal governments are more likely to 
ease tensions with state governments. Specifically, tribes should only claim 
authority over persons within Montana’s test, likely relying on the second 
prong to protect the health of tribal members. This could ease tensions with 
state governments and, in the process, increase the effectiveness of tribal 
programs.  
Tribal solid waste programs should also establish federal minimums as a 
floor. This should include implementing both a solid waste and hazardous 
waste program as required by the RCRA. Setting federal standards as the 
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minimum would increase the likelihood of a comprehensive, national solid 
waste regulatory system. It could also ease transitions to EPA involvement 
if Congress amends the RCRA to include a tribal TAS provision. Perhaps in 
states with higher minimums, tribal governments could set those state 
standards as the floor. Tribes implementing state standards should perhaps 
copy the state minimums into their codes versus relying on cross-
referencing to a state provision, especially because state standards can 
change more quickly than federal standards. Mostly, tribal governments 
should look closely at their abilities and tailor programs to the 
government’s capability. Additionally, tribes with the ability, expertise, and 
history to establish administrative agencies may benefit from the dynamism 
and expertise such entities provide.  
Further, tribal governments could focus on educational programs within 
their larger solid waste program, like the Muscogee (Creek) Nation does. 
This could be an opportunity to teach about the effects of climate change 
and perhaps be an opportunity to discuss landmarks and important sites 
within tribal land. Also, tribal governments might utilize public 
involvement in regulatory processes like the Navajo Nation does. This 
could lead to better-tailored programs and result in more compliance, 
especially if the populace feels they helped to create the program. Lastly, 
allowing citizen suits could increase the enforceability of environmental 
regulations. 
VI. Conclusion 
Tribal governments are a key component of the United States’ federal 
system, especially within environmental federalism. While many tribes 
have created their own solid waste management programs without the 
benefits of the RCRA primacy and funding, a TAS provision could improve 
these programs. TAS provisions would also better serve tribal governments 
by easing potential liability under RCRA’s minimum requirements, 
specifically by enabling funding to reach federal minimums. Tribes without 
solid waste programs should establish their own programs based on the 
needs, expertise, and ability of the tribe. But these programs should also 
maintain federal minimums. Lastly, whether McGirt will drastically reshape 
Indian Country throughout the United States will largely depend on whether 
disestablishment of specific reservations was accomplished statutorily and 
whether courts are willing to continue extending Indian criminal definitions 
to civil jurisdiction.  
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